In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in practice, can perform arbitrarily bad in the worst case. The problem can be formulated using a linear program with bounded and increasing variables. We then present an O(n log n) algorithm to find the optimal mechanism, where n is the number of players.
Introduction
User-generated-content (UGC) websites [1, 2, 3] refer to those whose contents rely on users' post. In the last decades, we have witnessed an increasing number of UGC websites such as videosharing website YouTube, question-and-answers website Quora and online encyclopedia Wikipedia where users generate contents autonomously. On such websites, users are both consumers who view contents and contributors who post contents. High-quality contents play an important role in the success of these websites. Therefore a fundamental challenge faced by the UGC websites is to incentivize users to contribute high-quality contents. In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing quality of all contents generated by users through a monetization reward mechanism [4, 5] .
In general, the center designs a reward function which maps a profile of users' contributed contents to a reward allocation. There are two natural models for such a reward function: a competitive model [6, 7, 8, 9] or an independent model [10, 11] . For example, a reward function used by the Olympic games depends on the rank of contribution among all players and thus it is a competitive model. Ghosh and Hummel [12] analyze the equilibrium in such rank-order mechanisms, where impressions are allocated in the decreasing order of content qualities. In particular, they also analyze the proportional mechanism, where impressions are allocated in proportional to qualities. Luo et al. [13] give an optimal solution to the all-pay contests where each agent's type (ability to generate good contents) is private and is drawn from a known distribution. They allow personalized reward function that can be different for different agents, while we impose the restriction of anonymity which is required by almost all these UGC sites. This paper focuses on the reward function for the independent model where an agent's reward doesn't depend on the quality other agents contribute. For example, a taxation rule used by government depends on how much a person earned regardless of other people's status [14, 15] . The merit of such an independent model is that it is easier for a user to compute the best strategy, and thus it is widely adopted in large-scale practical markets.
As a result, we restrict the design space to a universal reward function which maps from a user's contribution to a non-negative real reward. Dasgupta and Nti [16] considers a similar problem but they only focus on the case where the types of all agents are the same. In our model, we consider the general case where agents could have different types.
The goal of the center is to design such a reward mechanism to incentivize users to generate highquality contents as much as possible. When a user generates a content, the user also takes a cost that depends on his type. Given the reward function, a user can choose how much effort to put in generating the content and will take the best action to maximize utility. We now present the center question studied in this paper:
If the website has a fixed budget, what is the optimal reward mechanism?
Some mechanisms such as top-K allocation, proportional allocation have been proven simple to reach Nash Equilibria among users. However, we will show that the proportional allocation can benefit the center as little as an ǫ fraction of the optimal objective.
Our Techniques
We first give a characterization of the optimal reward mechanism and formalize it as a linear program with variables x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n of the form
where 0 < q 1 ≤ · · · ≤ q n , z i > 0 and K > 0. The connection between these variables and the mechanism will be discussed in detail in the context. Here we focus on this linear program.
Although there are various techniques of solving standard linear programmings [17] , linear programmings with specific forms are also studied in the literature. Andersson and Vorobyov [18] study a similar linear programming where each constraint has the form x i ≥ λx j + β for some β, λ ∈ R with 0 < λ < 1, and each variable appears in the left-hand side of at least one constraint. Burkard et al. [19] study a specific kind of linear programming with bounded constraints 0 ≤ x i ≤x i . However, their techniques do not help to solve our Problem (1).
In Section 5, we propose a greedy algorithm, which is, to our knowledge, the first efficient algorithm that solves linear programmings of the form (1). This algorithm initializes x * 1 = x * 2 = · · · = x * i−1 = 0, and maintains a set S of indices that indicate which x * i 's are currently full (i.e. x * i = q i ). The set S is initialized with {0, n+ 1} and the algorithm iteratively adds an index i to S in a greedy principle such that i minimizes the average value of z i , z i+1 , . . . , z min j>i:j∈S j−1 . At the same time it increases simultaneously x * i , x * i+1 , . . . , x * min j>i:j∈S j−1 by a value as large as possible, which means either x * i reaches the bound q i or n i=1 z i x * i reaches the bound K. This algorithm runs in Θ(n 2 ) time because one needs to maintain the average value of z i , z i+1 , . . . , z min j>i:j∈S j−1 for each i, and each time an index is added to S, it takes Θ(n) time to update these average values. Observing that for any i, the average value of z i , z i+1 , . . . , z min j>i:j∈S j−1 is only used in the iteration where i is chosen (let us denote by avg i this average value) 1 , it is straightforward to consider computing avg i in advance instead of maintaining the average value as S grows. In Section 6, we prove that if for each i, we compute avg i at the very beginning of the algorithm, and does not update it, the algorithm is still correct. The improved algorithm runs in O(n log n) time. Although our problem is motivated in the context of UGC website, our algorithm is of independent interest for solving linear programs of the form (1).
Preliminaries
Let N = (1, 2, . . . , n) be the set of all agents in a UGC website. Each agent i has a private type q i ∈ R + , which stands for the best quality of content that he can produce. Without loss of generally, we assume 0 < q 1 ≤ q 2 ≤ · · · ≤ q n . In this paper, we analyze the problem of incentivizing highquality contents in the full information setting where the type profile (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) is known to all agents and the website. The action of each agent i is posting a content with quality x i on the website where x i cannot exceed her type q i . In this paper, we consider a continuous action space, namely, x i ∈ [0, q i ]. The cost for agent i to produce a content with quality x i is c i = x i C/q i , where C is a positive constant.
Given a fixed budget B, the website aims to design a reward mechanism that maximizes the gross product, which is defined as the overall quality of all contents on the website, i.e., i∈N x i . The reward mechanism specifies each agent's reward when the budget and agents' types are given. Formally, Definition 1 (Reward mechanism). A reward mechanism is a reward function f where f : R+ → R+ is the mapping from the quality of a content to the reward.
Note that the reward function only takes one agent's action as the input, which means the reward an agent receives is only based on the quality of content he produces and independent of other agents' actions. This mechanism is simple and easily understood by agents, also makes agents pay more attention to their own contents instead of the environment.
We assume that agents can get no utilities except for the reward on the website, thus the utility of agent i is the reward she receives minus the cost of producing the content, i.e.,
All agents are strategic, meaning that they will give the best responses, choosing qualities of contents which maximize their utilities, to the reward function.
With strategic agents, our goal is to find an optimal reward function f that results in the maximal gross product. The problem we describe above can be represented as the optimization problem presented as below.
The Proportional Mechanism
In this section, we introduce the widely used mechanism, the proportional mechanism. In the proportional mechanism, agents share the total reward in proportional to the qualities of contents they produce. Formally, the utility of agent i in this mechanism can be represented as
In this mechanism, the utility of each agent depends not only on the quality of the content she produces, but also on the qualities of the contents other agents produce. However, this mechanism is very inefficient, in the sense that the ratio of the gross product of the website under any Nash equilibrium to that under any optimal solution in our mechanism can be infinitely small. We state its inefficiency on gross product in the following theorem. All the missing proofs in this paper are deferred to the appendices. 
This theorem shows that our mechanism corresponding to Problem (2) beats the proportional mechanism a lot.
The optimal Mechanism
The problem we formulate in Section 2 is complicated since the optimization variable is a mapping, which has a huge design space. In this section, we prove that the original problem can be solved in polynomial time. We first show that there always exists an optimal solution such that
n , which implies an agent with higher type will post a content with higher quality. Then we characterize the optimal piecewise reward function. By taking advantages of such characterization, we formulate a linear programming to find the optimal solution.
Lemma 1 implies that we can only focus on the ordinal strategy profile
n . However, this characterization is not enough to make x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n feasible because there may not exist a reward function f that incentivizes the agents. Given the ordinal strategy profile (x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n ), the following lemma gives a necessary and sufficient condition of f that makes (f,
feasible solution to (2) if and only if
Moreover, if (3) is satisfied, to make (f, x * 1 , . . . , x * n ) a feasible solution, we can set
The two lemmas above induce an equivalent linear programming to solve the original problem.
Theorem 2. Problem (2) has the same optimal value as the following linear programming:
Once an optimal solution (x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n ) is obtained, an optimal reward function can be constructed as (4) .
For ease of representation, let z i be the coefficient of x * i in the budget constraint in Problem (5), that is, z i = (n − i)(1/q i − 1/q i+1 ) + 1/q i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, and z n = 1/q n , then we can see that Problem (5) is exactly the form of Problem (1), where K = B/C. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on Problem (1).
A Greedy Algorithm
In this section, we propose a Θ(n 2 ) greedy algorithm that solves Problem (1) (thus Problem (5) is also solved). We first present our algorithm and then show the output of the algorithm is exactly an optimal solution of Problem (1).
For ease of representation, let us define
In Problem (5), since for any i < j ≤ n, sum(i, j) = (n − i + 1)/q i − (n − j + 1)/q j , and sum(i, n + 1) = (n − i + 1)/q i , both the functions sum and avg can be computed in O(1) time.
In the more general Problem (1), we still assume that they can be computed in O(1) time. For the Θ(n 2 ) algorithm proposed in this section, this assumption is reasonable because we can compute sum(i, j) and avg(i, j) for each i, j in advance, which does not increase the time complexity of the algorithm. We will give further explanation why this assumption is reasonable at the end of Section 6.
Note there are three kinds of constraints in Problem (1), and it is their combination that makes this problem non-trivial:
where i is the index that minimizes avg(i, n + 1).
Without the constraint
0 ≤ x * 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x * n ,the following simple algorithm would output an optimal solution: initializing x * 1 = x * 2 = · · · = x * n = 0, and then increasing x * i to q i for each i in the order for z i 's from large to small, until n i=1 z i x * i reaches K.
When all the three kinds of constraints exist, none of the methods above applies, which makes Problem (1) hard to solve.
Our algorithm can be considered as a combination of the three methods above. In short, our algorithm initializes x * 1 = x * 2 = · · · = x * i−1 = 0, and maintains a set S of indices that indicate which x * i 's are currently full (i.e., x * i = q i ). The set S is initialized with {0, n + 1} and the algorithm iteratively adds an index i to S in a greedy principle such that i minimizes the average value of z i , z i+1 , . . . , z min j>i:j∈S j−1 . At the same time it increases simultaneously x * i , x * i+1 , . . . , x * min j>i:j∈S j−1 by a value as large as possible, which means either x * i reaches the bound q i or n i=1 z i x * i reaches the bound K. This whole algorithm is formally shown as Algorithm 1.
Suppose Algorithm 1 runs for k iterations in total, and Line 7 chooses i * to be i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k in order. We define S ℓ to be the set S after the ℓth iteration, i.e., S ℓ = {0, i 1 , . . . , i ℓ , n + 1}. In addition, we define left ℓ (i) = max
Note by these definitions, we have in the ℓth iteration,
The notations used to analyze Algorithm 1 are summarized in Table 1 .
Before we prove the correctness of this algorithm, we state Lemma 3 to show how the values of x i , y i 's andB change in the algorithm.
Lemma 3. Immediately after the ℓth (ℓ < k) iteration, for each i, we have
These properties also hold for ℓ = k except that x i k is not necessarily equal to q i k . 
17 output x 1 , . . . , x n as x * 1 , . . . , x * n ;
Algorithm 2: Improved Algorithm 1
10B ← K; 11 whileB > 0 and S = {0, 1, . . . , n + 1} do
if and only if a < c, or a = c and b < d, so if there are minimum values, the algorithm will choose the one with the smallest index z i x i = K, or x i = q i for each i. Now we begin to prove the correctness of Algorithm 1. We first show that the subset {x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x i k } of the output of Algorithm 1 matches an optimal solution.
Lemma 5. Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n be the variables after the last iteration. There exists an optimal solution for Problem (1) such that
. ., and
With Lemma 5, it is not hard to prove the correctness of Algorithm 1. We state it as Theorem 3. Proof. Consider the optimal solution in Lemma 5. Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n be the variables after the last iteration. By Lemma 5, we have x * i = x i for all x ∈ S k . Now let us fix some i / ∈ S k . By the feasibility constraints in Problem (1), we have
. By (6) we have x left k (i) = x i . Hence we can conclude that for any i, no matter whether i ∈ S k or not, x * i ≥ x i . If there exists some i such that x * i > x i , then x i < q i , and by Lemma 4,
z i x i = K, which contradicts to the feasibility constraints in Problem (1). As a result, for any i, x * i = x i . This algorithm is an optimal algorithm.
A More Efficient Algorithm
Note in Algorithm 1, the variables x i 's and y i 's are updated many times by Line 13 and 15 in each iteration, which are two main bottlenecks that make this algorithm run in Θ(n 2 ) time. In this section, we aim to improve this algorithm by avoiding redundant computation of x i 's and y i 's. The improved algorithm runs in O(n log n) time.
We first solve the bottleneck for y i 's. For any i, let us denote by b(i) (the blocker for i) the final i * in the last update for y i . If there is no blocker for i, i.e., y i keeps 1/q i all along, let b(i) = n + 1 for convenience. In addition, let b 0 (·) be the identity function, and b m (·) = b(b m−1 (·)). The following lemma shows that if we know b(i) for each i in advance, we can improve our algorithm by directly assigning avg(i, b(i)) to y i at the beginning, no need of updating y i any more.
Lemma 6. If we modify Algorithm 1 by initializing y i to be avg(i, b(i)) (before the while loop) and not updating them any more (deleting Line 14 to 15), then for any inputs, the modified version has the same outputs as Algorithm 1's.
Lemma 6 gives us insights to design more efficient algorithms. If the blockers are known in advance, a faster algorithm gets naturally. Hence the main challenge becomes finding the blocker for each i. We will state some properties of the blockers first in the following lemmas. Then we will show how to design an algorithm to get such blockers by using their properties. Lemma 9 shows two inequality relations among avg's related to i L , i * , i R in each iteration. Figure  1 diagrams these relations.
Lemma 9. In each iteration, for any
i * < i < b(i * ), we have avg(i * , i) ≤ avg(i, b(i * )), and for any i L < i < i * , we have avg(i, b(i * )) < avg(i, i * ).
Lemma 10. In any iteration, if there exists some m and j such that
By combining Lemma 9 and 10, we can get the following corollary immediately.
Corollary 1. In any iteration, if there exists some m ≥ 1 and j such that
With the properties stated above, we can show the following important property of b(i), which suggests us a way to find b(i) for each i. 
and if b m+1 (i + 1) exists,
Proof. We first show that b(i) = b m (i + 1) for some m. We can assume there exists j such that i 
By choosing τ to be t + 1, t + 2, . . . , m − 1 and combining these inequalities, we have avg(b
Then we consider the iteration where i * = i. By Lemma 9 we have avg(i, b
Combining the two inequalities above, we have proved (9) . Moreover, if b m+1 (i + 1) exists, consider the iteration where (10) Proof. The only tricky parts are Line 6 to 7 and Line 15 to 16. Now let us fix an index j. Suppose Line 6 accesses j as b i and the condition in the while loop still holds, which means i < j < b(i). We can prove by mathematical induction that for any i ′ < i, there does not exist m such that b m (i ′ + 1) = j, which means j will not be accessed by Line 6 any more. In other words, except for the last iteration in the loop corresponding to to Line 6 to 7, each index is accessed as b i at most once by Line 6 during the whole algorithm. Hence Line 4 to 9 cost O(n) time in total.
To efficiently update x i 's in Line 15 to 16, we can use a binary indexed tree. More precisely, we maintain an array A of size n. Initially A is filled with zeros. Each time we add d to x i , x i+1 . . . , x j , we instead increase So the whole algorithm runs in O(n log n) time.
Recall that the analysis above is based on the fact that avg(i, j) can be computed in O(1) time for any i < j. This is true for our UGC website problem, but what if we are facing a general problem of the form (1), where avg(i, j) cannot be computed in O (1) 
Now in this new pseudocode, there is no avg any more, so Algorithm 2 is able to run in O(n log n) time even if avg(i, j) cannot be computed in O(1) time. cannot be 0 at the same time.
Without loss of generality, we assume x
is an optimal value for u 1 (x) over (0, q 1 ], and u
Then after performing a similar argument as above, we have
By combining (11) and (12) we get x
. So we can set q 1 = min{ǫ, 1/2} and q 2 = 1 − q 1 , then (x
By contrast, if we set the reward function f to be
then agent 1 would not participate while agent 2 is incentivized to produce a content with quality q 2 . Hence we have x * 1 + x * 2 = q 2 , which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Note we can arbitrarily reorder x * i 's for players with the same ability with keeping the solution feasible, we can assume x * i ≥ x * j if q i = q j for each i > j without loss of generality. We then show that with this assumption, x * i ≥ x * j for each i > j even if q i > q j , which completes the proof.
Let us consider indices i > j with q i > q j . Suppose x * j > x * i . By the incentive constraint, we have
By summing up the two inequalities above, we have (
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose f with x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n is a feasible solution to (2) . Note by the incentive constraint, we have for any i,
This inequality holds for any i, so we can sum up the inequalities for 1, 2, . . . , i to get
By summing up (13) from i = 1 to n, we have
Since by the budget constraint, (3) is proven. On the other hand, suppose (3) is satisfied, we can choose f to be a step function according to (13) , i.e.,
We can check that f with x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n is a feasible solution to (2).
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Consider the last iteration, i.e., the iteration where i
, thenB is updated to 0 in Line 11. Now suppose n i=1 z i x i = K, thenB = 0 by (8), thus d must be q i * − x i * , therefore x * i is updated to q i * in Line 13, hence x i k = q i k after this iteration. Moreover, sinceB = 0 but the algorithm halts after this iteration, so we must have S = {0, 1, . . . , n + 1} by the condition in Line 7. This means immediately after the (ℓ − 1)th iteration, S = {0, 1, . . . , n + 1} − i k , and by (6), for each i = i k , x i = q i . Hence x i = q i for each i.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We prove there exists an optimal solution for Problem (1) such that for any ℓ ≤ k, x * i 1 = x i 1 , x * i 2 = x i 2 , . . ., and x * i ℓ = x i ℓ , by mathematical induction on ℓ.
The case where ℓ = 0 is trivial. Consider an operation that for any r ≤ i < right ℓ (r), decreases x * i by M/sum(r, right ℓ (r)), then for any i ℓ ≤ i < right ℓ (i ℓ ), increases x * i by M/sum(i ℓ , right ℓ (i ℓ )). This operation is diagramed in Figure 2 
